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ABSTRACT 
The past twenty-five years have witnessed a significant increase in the 
ability of Inuit groups to defend local interests ag; inst the intrusions of 
their respective nation-state and, as a result, assume a greater degree of 
control over their own societies . Most of this increase can be attributed 
to a series of similar political development proces ses which have occurred 
throughout the Arctic largely in response to the conflict initiated by 
threats to the Inuit ' s mode of production and resource base . 
This disser t at i on explores the impetus as well as the course of thi s 
pol i tical development. Followi ng an examination of the theoret i cal origins 
of t he confli ct , centring on the cultur a l i mper a tives l i nking a hunting 
s ociety to its r esour ce base , attenti on is bri e f l y devo t ed to t he 
powe r lessness ass ociated wi t h t he polit i cal s t at us qua as it existed c i r ca 
1960. Focus then moves to a number of case studies in an attempt to 
satisfactorily e luc idate t he pr oces s es i nvol ved. These i nc lude those of t he 
Alaskan North Slope, the Canadian western and central Arctic, Quebec's 
Ungava Peninsula and Greenl and. Through examination of thes e examples, 
causality is assigned to particular catalytic events. seen as generating the 
response , a resource- based commonality of thes e event s is established, and 
the speci fi c st r ategies developed by the Inuit are clarified. 
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PREFACE 
The people who designate themselves 1 Inuit 1 occupy a broad territorial 
expanse stretching from just south of Alaska's ' Seward Peninsula on the 
west, across arc tic North America at a latitude corresponding roughly to 
tree-line, to and including all of the ice-free coastal portions of the 
island of Greenland <Map 1). They do not, despite popular misconception, 
include those speakers of related Yup'ik languages inhabiting southern and 
south-western Alaska, St. Lawrence Island or the Soviet mainland <~yKoTCKH~ 
n-oe), to whom the word I Inuit' is only slightly less alien than was the 
previously imposed term of 'Eskimo' <see Krauss, 1980). This dissertation 
is confined to the political development of the former, geographically 
contextualized by the limits of their common language, referred to for 
simplicity's sake herein solely by its Canadian Inuit designation of 
1 Inuk ti tut' . Apologies are extended to the perhaps two dozen surviving 
Soviet Inuit, formally residents of Big Diomede Island <OcTpoe PaTMaHosa>, 
who were excludec;i from this study only due to limitations imposed by a 
lack of available data . 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Inuktitut word 'nunat' and the Latin 'terra' share more than their 
common English transliteration of 'land': in each may be recognized a 
similar and basic expression of territorial imperative. It is, of course, 
from 'terra' that the English noun 'territory' was derived, · originally 
applied to that area surrounding a city and over which it expressed 
jurisdiction (Guttmann, 1973: 16). From this same source has come 
'territoriality', implying 
purpose of I among other 
resources (Taylor, 1985 : 96). 
the enforced control of territory for 
things, maintaining preferential access 
the 
to 
'Nunat' has been imbued with similar connotations. From it have sprung 
such expressions of Inuit territorial aspirations as I Kalaalli t Nunaat' 
Cl and of the Greenlanders' > 1 'Inuvialui t Nunangat' (peoples' land), and 
• Nunavut' (our land), all geographical constructs relating to particular 
areas holding special significance to specific groups. Nunat is clearly an 
enduring theme in_ Inuit political thought and there f or e appea r s as a l ike ly 
sour ce of t he confl i ct viewed as generating Inuit political development . 
Poli tical development has been desc r ibed as the process by which a 
group increases its capac ity to de t e rmine the nat ure and di r ec t i on of it s 
own society (Morehouse, 1987: 1). With respect to the Inuit, it is generally 
believed to have occurred in response to the increasing intervention of the 
nation-state into local lives and affairs. It is, however, necessary to 
refine this explanation somewhat further, as much of the intervention has 
been confined to the delivery of programs and services, which while 
unquestionably disrupt! ve have been at least arguably of benefit to the 
local population and therefore unlikely to have assumed a catalytic role. 
One common activity of the nation-state, though, does appear to have been 
particularly disruptive: that of natural resource ~eveloper or at least as 
the enthusiastic promoter of that development. It is this intrusive 
development which seems most likely to have initiated the conflict over 
control of 'nunat'. 
Further rationale for the Inuit response must be sought elsewhere and 
one productive source is the literature of economic anthropology, 
especially rich in models purporting to explain the relationships linking a 
hunting society to its mode of production and resource base. Two 
suppositions normally attributed to that discipline, while not appearing 
especially relevant at first glance, contain the foundation upon which an 
explanation might be built. These are: first, that a specific mode of 
production is primarily a function of the environment within which it has 
evolved; and second, that the culture of a hunting-gathering soc iety is to 
a large exten t a _f unction of its prevailing mode of production. Both will 
be examined in greater detail in the following chapter. 
Given the above, it follows that the Inuit would recognize intrusive 
resource development as an immediate and obvious threat to the continued 
reproduction of their mode of production, and hence, a threat to the 
continuation of their culture as a whole. Were this the case and in the 
face of such a threat, one would expect to observe an immediate coun tering 
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response. Such responses hav~ indeed been evident, and have in fact formed 
an integral part of .the political development process. This then is the 
thesis of this dissertation: that Inuit political development represents 
just such a response, and has been motivated primarily by a desire to re-
establish control over or at least retain access to the traditional 
resource base. 
The methodology selected to test this ptoposition is relatively 
straightforward: within the larger context of an historical synopsis 
outlining the five primary threads of observed Inuit political change, this 
paper will assign causality to specific events, establish the resource-
based commonality of these events and identify attempts to ameliorate the 
initially motivating threats. This approach offers the greatest promise for 
being able to successfully clarify the both numerous and varied factors 
currently influencing the political development process . 
While it is my intention to confine this dissertation to the 
elucidation of this single set of relationships , the choice of this 
particular axis must not be over-emphasized . Although undeniably important , 
causality can not be assi gned to this source alone : any conflict is capable 
of initiating a political r esponse and this axis is only one among many. 
Neither should ·.political development be viewed as purely a reactive 
process: many of the exemplars to follow cl early display proactive elements 
as well. Despite these caveats, however, examination of this particular 
axis does offer a unique perspective from which to view both the driving 
impetus and the resulting course of Inuit political change. 
As it is impossible to understand a society's political evolution 
without having devoted ample consideration to the ' premisses' from which it 
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has developed, two items of critical importance to the process must first 
be addressed : first, the significance retained by the indigenous mode of 
production must be adequately established and explained; and second , it 
must be demonstrated that the authority vested in the Inuit' s political_ 
status qua, circa 1960, was inadequate to defend this local interest 
against the onslaught of intrusive resource pressure. As it is these two 
i terns which best exemplify the source of the Inui1; concerns, 1 t is they 
which have played the most vital roles in subsequently shaping its nature. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE NATURE OF THE THREAT 
1.1 The Culture of Subsistence 
Although environmental determinism has lost most of its early favour, 
even such unquestionably liberal social scientists as Kleivah (1964: 63) 
have been forced to admit that "certain aspects of a culture stand in a 
definite relationship to the natural environment respectively limiting 
and permitting human activities . " It is obvious, for example, that a mode 
of production based on foraging must exploit the land directly. Just as the 
availability of resources has determined the character of this mode of 
production, so too must it have effected the size of individual bands, 
their formation and their stability. As it is these factors which serve to 
determine the necessity and extent o f political control , it is reasonable 
t o conclude, as did Meillassoux <1969: 199), that the nature of the 
relationship linking a f oraging societ y with its environment could have 
significant impac~ on the society's subsequent political evol ution. 
In traditional Inuit societies every member o f the band retained equal 
rights of access to the resourc es lying within its territorial 
jurisdiction. As it was impossible for any individual to exercise exclusive 
rights to these res,ources, there was lacking any clear and substantial 
source of internal conflict <Cohen, 1968: 71). Through the exclusion of 
these subsistence resources from competition, the band had effectively 
insured its own survival . Engels (1942: 144) noted that within hunting 
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societies displaying this non-differentiated access to resources, the need 
for social mediation was minimal. It seems likely, therefore, that these 
societies had not developed the need for such "specialized institutions of 
government" as are characteristic of Euro-American political authority. 
Once, however, control over productive resources (including such things as 
land, labour, animals, water, etc.) did become unequally distributed, 
conflict became not only likely, but inevitable <-Newman, 1983: 207). Inuit 
political development seems, to a large extent, to be attributable to just 
such a process. 
Taylor (1985: 7) has described a 'mode of production' as including, 
"not only the way in which productive tasks are divided up but also 
decisions concerning the quantities of goods to be produced, their 
consumption and/or accumulation along with the resulting distributiOn." 
Most author! ties would agree that, as such, the mode of production plays a 
central role in the ultimate definition of a society. For the purpose of 
this study, the prevailing Inuit mode of production will be termed 
'subsistence', despite the controversy which such an assertion may possibly 
invite (see Lee, 1981). This is in keeping with Lonner (1986: 15-16), who 
has suggested: 
Subsistence is ... a system of production for both use and 
exchange. Its object is not total self-sufficiency nor capital 
formation but an endless flow of goods, services, and other 
products ... a highly specialized mode of production. 
A subsistence economy, as can readily be recognized, is composed of a 
number of interwoven components of which at least three must be considered 
crucial to this discussion. 
( 7 ) 
Its productive function is apparent: the procurement of food, involving 
direct appropriation from the land (often referred to in the 
anthropological literature as 'foraging') . Viewed by the larger society as 
primitive and inefficient, there has been increasing pressure applied 
toward hastening its replacement with a wage-economy more in keeping with 
the national model. To a large extent, this strategy has been successful: 
it is unlikely that there is a single Inuit vrllage whose subsistence 
production has remained unaltered by the intrusion of mercantile 
capitalism. Still, subsistence as a whole remains amazingly vital. 
In his study of Canada's Mackenzie Delta area during the years 1973-74, 
Usher examined the subsistence usage of Aklavik, Inuvik, Tuktoyaktuk, 
Paulatuk and Sachs Harbour. His study found that the 2000 Inuit residents, 
comprised of 300 different families, harvested over $800, OOO (Canadian) 
worth of fur and over $1.6 million worth of food in a single year, 
representing an average gross family income of approximately $8000 (cited 
in Berger, 1977: 106). 
Alaskan I~upiat show a similar, if slightly lower, level of dependence . 
It has been reported that 98% of the Ifiupiat households of the North Slope 
participate at least minimally in the subsistence economy, including even 
the relatively prpsperous residents of Barrow, whe re 41% of the households 
continue to obtain greater than half their food in this manner <Kruse, 
1986: 128). 
Like the Inuit of Canada and Alaska, the Greenlanders, too, remain 
heavily reliant on their subsistence economy <see Hansen, . 1976). In six of 
Greenland ' s eighteen municipalities, located for the most part in the north 
and the east and representing 20% of the population, hunting is still 
classified as the primary economic activity (Dahl, 1988: 6). Even in the 
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more urban west, at least those portions surrounding smaller villages, 
small-scale fishing is still largely · supplemented by hunting. Although 
there is a growing trend to convert some of this production into cash, more 
easily exchanged for necessities of modern life, this sector of the economy 
retains much of its subsistence orientation. Kleivan (1984: 7 13- 4) has 
reported that in the nation as a whole, 
exceeded 15 million Danish kroner in 1980. 
incomes derived from hunting 
At present, subsistence production clearly comprises a majority of 
Inuit self-generated economic activity and prospec ts for the development of 
the necessary degree of wage-based income required to replac e it remain 
remote. Not only are the foods obtained as a result of these activities of 
critical nutritional importance, but due to the lack of cash to pay for 
expensive imported foods and the inavailability of any cheap alternative, 
options to its use are practically non-existent <Langdon, 1986:32). To deny 
access to this resource without prior and adeq~ate provision made for its 
replacement, based either on wages or substantially increased transfer 
payments, would result in social disruption of a scale only previously 
experienced during the forced centralization of the Greenlandic population 
in the mid-1960s (to be discussed in Chapter 6). 
Much of the cpnflict over northern natural resources can be traced to 
the tendency of the dominant 
activities only in terms of 
society to view traditional subsistence 
the aforementioned productive capacity, 
ignoring totally any accompanying non-productive components. The social 
component of subsistence is one pa r ticularly far-reachit:)g such example . 
Among other things, it includes the key elements of kinship, central to 
economic system' s productive distribution and as a result the basis for 
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much of the culture itself. 
Under the traditional Inuit mode · of production, it was kinship which 
provided the structure for both production and distribution, with 
individuals linked through common dependence in complex chains of exchange 
and obligation. Although the individual acquired the right to utilize 
resources through his membership in the community, this right carried 
obligations as well, requiring the indi victual' s .,participation in a full 
spectrum of local activities (Br0sted, 1986:327). Dahl (1988: 19) has noted, 
with regard to the Inuit of Saqqaq, Greenland, that " (i >n beluga hunting 
and during the important sharing of meat and 'mattak', authority, hunting 
ability, alliances and conflicts are established, reproduced or formed in 
public, this confirming and correcting communal values." The importance of 
kinship is obvious, but what is its source? 
Meillassoux has suggested that in the final analysis, kinship is 
neither a genealogical nor a biological concept, but a social one (cited in 
Kahn, 1981:64). Hindess and Hirst (1975:64) have concurred, arguing that it 
is the continued reproduction of the economy which established the 
conditions necessary for the development of such a complex system and 
implying at least that the relationships central to kinship may have 
initially develop~d as a response to productive demands . Were these latter 
two arguments deemed valid , it would both explain and suppor t the enduring 
Inui t belief that subsistence practices play a crucial role in cultur al 
r etenti on . 
Similar arguments may be attached to the role of subsistence in social 
development. Traditionally, the pr ogress of young people has been pri marily 
gauged according to the acquisition of cer t ai n sk ills associated directly 
with the procurement or processing of wild f ood (Lonner , 1986:21) . While 
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threa ts he re have been especially subtle, they are recognizable in even t he 
most benevolent of the intrusions of the nation-state, as for example in 
the Western-style education of Inuit children. Asch <1982: 365) has noted, 
based on his work with the Dene, that llaside from making bush [subsistence] 
production more difficult, the main consequence of this policy has been to 
interfere directly in the normal enculturation process by which traditional 
skills as well as social relations of production were reproduced." 
The ideological component of subsistence proves the most difficult to 
satisfactorily define. As could be expected of a people with an historic 
hunting-gathering tradition, the Inuit have evolved a cosmology firmly 
rooted in the relationship linking themselves to their environment . Many of 
the taboos of traditional Inuit society can be shown to have developed as 
the result of subsistence demands, their emphasis on the pacification of 
the spirits of harvestable animals necessary to insure subsistence 
proquction. 
Despite the intrusion of Western society, these traditional beliefs 
persist, a fact emphasized repeatedly to the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline 
Inquiry by Inuit who testified that they viewed themselves "as inseparable 
from the land, the waters and the animals with which they share the world 
<Berger, 1977 : 93) ; " In his later report for the Alaska Native Review 
Commission, Berger < 1985: 53) well summarized Inuit concerns when he noted 
that "subsistence links the village . .. with its past, it informs the 
presen t, and it is the means whereby t he vi llage can survi ve i n the 
future." Taken in this context, it is not surprising . that even the 
threatened disruption of thes e ac tivi t i es would be int er pr eted as an 
attack launched at the very heart of Inuit s e lf - i dentity and responded t o 
in a manner appropriate t o its perceived gravity. 
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1. 2 Commentary 
Although it is not always so apparent, in the North as in the rest of 
the world, resources are scarce. Due to the finite quantity of any one 
resource available for possible exploitation, priori ties must be assigned 
and choices made. Usually, however, a decision to place a priority on the 
development or protection of any single resource will have a significant 
and often negative impact . on the opportunity for the utilization of 
another. Opposing uses may in fact be mutually exclusive, as are some forms 
of stibsistence production and some types of exploitative development. 
The assignment of priorities for natural resource utilization reflects, 
to a large extent, the cultural context in which the motivating needs were 
first identified. Because perceptions of optimal goals vary widely among 
differing cultural groups and as the priorities seem to be assigned 
exclusively at the prerogative of the dominant society , it is not 
surprising that a wide gulf would separate the interests of the intrusive 
population from those of the Inuit. 
The conflict centres on the locus of resource control, both because 
this control offer~ the greatest promise for protecting local interests and 
because it is to its possessor that potential benefits of resource 
exploitation will most certainly accrue. Because this resource conflict has 
presented the most visible and immediate threat to the Inuit's indigenous 
mode of production, it has seen its most fr equent manifestation in the land 
title issues which have become nearly ubiquitous in the Native claims 
process. 
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CHAPTER · TWO 
THE POLITICAL STATUS QUO 
At the onset of the 1960s, Inuit political control over their own 
territory, and therefore the ability to meaningfully participate in 
decisions effecting it, can only be described as minimal. As late as the 
mid- 1960s, Jenness (1964: 161), in summing up Canadian northern policy 
specifically, but equally applicable to the areas under the jurisdiction of 
the United States and Denmark, remarked, "we have set up a complex 
government . . . but offered them [ the indigenous peoples] no real place in 
i t; and, what is worse, we have not inspired any hope that there will be a 
real place for them." 
Traditional Inuit government, unique, historically relevant and 
heretofore eminently suitable methods for the political control of their 
own population within the limits of their own arena, had for the most part 
been long supplanted by intrusive institutions better reflecting the 
poli ti cal heri tage and aspira ti ons of the respective nation-state . These 
new institut i ons ·can bes t be charac t eriz ed as having been imposed f r om 
above , hi gh l y var i able in form and general ly of quite restricted au t ho r ity . 
2.1 Alaska 
On the Alaskan North Slope of this period, Inuit village gove rnments 
assumed several forms, each with its own distinctive features. One group 
consisted of those organized under Section 16 of the Indian Reorganization 
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Act of 1934 (IRA), amended for Alaska in 1936. These governments, 
legitimized via the adoption of a federally chartered constitution, were 
delegated responsibility for the self-administration of native inhabitants 
organized on the basis of "a common bond of occupancy, or association, or 
residence." <cited in Case, 1984:375). As eligibility to participate in 
IRA programs was restricted to individuals demonstrating at least one-
fourth blood quantum as determined by the 'Tribal, ., Council, the authority 
of an IRA government was restricted to the control of their own ethnic 
population. Because of this discriminatory requirement, these governments 
were ineligible for recognition under Alaska state law, a significant 
constraint as it both limited potential funding and denied any opportunity 
for the exercise of authority over resident non-members. 
The limitations of a typical village IRA government of the period were 
well illustrated in Vanstone' s (1962: 103) classic study of Point Hope. In 
his discussion of the IRA Council then in operation, he notes: 
The council acts also as a rule-making and law-enforcing body 
although it has no power to enforce its rulings . If individuals 
lodge complaints against others, these are handled by the council. 
Cases of public drunkenness and various other misdemeanors are 
punished by fines. The council has the power to shoot dogs that 
are not tied and can levy a fine against individuals who do not 
haul dead dog~ out on the ice. 
After Alaska achieved statehood in 1959, communities sought to alleviate 
some of the deficiencies intrinsic to the IRA structure by organizing under 
Title 29 of Alaska's Municipal Statutes, as well <Case, 1984:372- 3). By the 
mid-1960s the three largest of the North Slope villages had all organized 
in this manner, including the second-class city of Barrow and the fourth-
class cities of Wainwright and Point Hope (Morehouse et al., 1984: 141). 
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While Barr ow by virtue of its second-class status was empowered to levy 
property taxes and by so doing achieved a limited degree of local autonomy, 
the fourth-class cities were empowered only to levy sales taxes, their 
independently controlled funding and therefore their potential authority 
correspondingly reduced. 
The two smallest North Slope communities, Kaktovik (Barter Island) and 
Anaktuvuk Pass adopted neither an IRA nor a state mutlicipal form, retaining 
instead their traditional village councils headed by elder males. While 
these retained local legitimacy, 
either federal or state law 
their lack of formal recognition under 
severely restricted their potential 
effectiveness <McBeath and Morehouse, 1980 : 13). 
2.2 Canada 
During this same period in the Northwest Territories <NWT) of the 
central and eastern Canadian Arctic, the status of Inuit government was in 
some ways similar, in others quite different. The largest of the 
differences was at the supra-regional level, that of the territory itself. 
Here, the Inuit lacked even the titular representation which the Alaskan 
Constitution and i _ts elected government promised to the North Slope. A 
territorial government existed, but only as an appointed body predictably 
lacking any discrete authority. So locally unresponsive was this government 
that it has been described as merely an administrative branch of the 
fe deral government and its Territorial Council littl e mor e than a conunittee 
attached to the Department of Northe rn Aff a ir s a nd Na t ur a l Resourc e s 
<DNANR) <Drury, 1980:30). 
As l a t e as 1964, Inuit residents of the NWT had no t ye t e ven been 
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granted the right to vote in federal elections <Zariwny, 1977: 7). The 
territorial government tended to support this federal decision, believing 
at the time that "... the level of education and sophistication among the 
Eskimo population had not reached the point where more than a small 
minority understood what was meant by an election and representation 
<N. W. T., 1961: 12-13)." Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that 
Inuit participation was limited. 
The Canadian federal government had, however, made attempts to 
During the 1950s the DNANR had encourage local government in the North. 
dispatched a group of federal bureaucrats, the Northern Service Officers 
<NS0s), to the Arctic with the implied objective of establishing simple 
structures and processes designed to allow the Inuit to gradually assume 
their own administrative tasks. Unfortunately, prior to this goal being 
accomplished, a reorganization of the DNANR redefined the NSOs role, 
reducing it to merely that of program delivery administration. As a result, 
NS0s were required to spend the majority of their time actively managing 
local affairs rather than in training community residents in the skills 
necessary to eventually manage their own <Zariwny, 1977: 10-11). 
By the conclusion of the 1950'5, two types of local government had 
emerged, both settlement manager / counci l forms, but with the major 
difference of either an appointed advisory or an elected council , In the 
case of the appointed advisory council, all influence was exercised through 
advice tendered to the settlement manager by a council appointed by the 
government of the Northwest Territories. As a result, no real author! ty 
over local concerns was within local control <op.cit. :23). 
The situation with the elected council was only slightly better. 
Al though these cornrnuni ties did have a fully elected council, with nominal 
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executive functions held by the council's chairman, ultimate authority 
still rested with the settlement manager who retained responsibility for 
all civil functions, including delivery of settlement services and control 
-of operation and maintenance funds. Again, as with the appointed council, 
the input of the local residents was mainly advisory (op.cit. :24). 
An excellent description is given by .Williamson (1974: 150-1) of the 
settlement manager system then functioning in RankiR Inlet: 
While the Mine was in operation, the Mine Manager did not 
attempt to conceal the fact that he regarded the Eskimo Council 
... as an instrument of social organisation in the interests 
of the community as they reflected the interests of the Mine . 
. . . The Council met irregularly, and always at the behest of the 
Mine Manager, through his Eskimo Foreman, and very usually met 
in the Mine Manager's house. The Council never met on its own 
initiative. 
2.3 Greenland 
Prior to 1963, Greenland's Thule District was still governed under the 
Laws of the Cape York Station Thule of 7 June 1929. This Act delegated 
local government functions to a Hunter's Council, consisting of six 
members, three of whom were Danes, the manager of the trading station, the 
local priest and the doctor , and three appointed Inuit, representing each 
of the district's three regions. Acting with a quorum of four, this Council 
possessed limited degrees of both legislative and judicial authority, 
allowing it to propose initiatives, establish rules of social and economic 
conduct, and pass sentences on offenders <Br0sted and Fregteborg, 1985 : 218). 
The situation in East Greenland was similar, with councils established in 
1946 for both Angmagssalik and Scoresbysund . As in Thule, these councils 
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contained both Inuit and Danish members and were limited in scope to the 
passing of minor local ordinances and to the prosecution of their violation 
<Petersen, 1984: 638) . 
In Greenland's more urban west, the situation- was considerably 
different. The Greenland Act of 18 April 1925 had made provision for a 
limited degree of self-government through the organization of seventy-six 
(76) municipal councils, thirteen (13) district ~councils and two (2) 
provincial councils. A new Act of 27 May 1950 consolidated these into 
sixteen (16) municipalities with but a single Provincial Council, delegated 
additional authority and significantly improved funding <Denmark, 1954: 14). 
Local power, however, was sti 11 severely constrained and appears to have 
been not significantly greater than that which was available to Inuit 
groups in Alaska and Canada during the same time-frame. 
The meetings of the Municipal Councils were usually restricted to such 
issues as the sale of alcohol, the allocation of housing and occasionally 
other areas of town planning in consultation with the Greenland Technical 
Organization. The Council regulatory powers were largely confined to the 
sale of alcohol, the control of dogs and the construction of roads, all of 
which remained subject to the confirmation of the Governor of Greenland 
<Schuurman, 1976: 52_). 
At the Provincial level, the power of the Council was confined largely 
to an advisory capacity, al though a requirement was made that all Danish 
proposals for measures affecting Greenland be submitted for deliberation 
and recommendation . The degree to which the Provincial Council was 
representative of the population is subject to argument: of the seventeen 
members of the 1967 Provincial Council, thirteen were employees of the 
Danish State, while only four were sealers or fishermen. Until 1967 the 
< 18 > 
Governor of Greenland, himself an appointed civil servant, still served as 
its president (Hesselbjerg, 1971: 183-86). 
2.4 Commentary 
It should be obvious from the previous examples that the political 
institutions operating in the North at the onset of the 1960s, due 
primarily to constraints inherent in the political structures which had 
been imposed, offered 11 t tle opportunity for the Inuit to successfully 
establish control over their own 11 ves and affairs and perhaps even of 
greater importance, defend local interests. It is hardly surprising, 
therefore, that in meeting new threats the Inuit chose to establish 
institutions offering significantly greater promise. Feit (1981:404), based 
· on his work with the Cree, has suggested a logical explanation of the 
processes involved: 
... when hunting peoples in developed states are able to 
mobilize some political/ economic leverage in the macro-
arena then it may be possible for them not only to resist 
external pressures leading to a restructuring of their own 
social fabric, but they may be able to restructure the 
relationship between themselves and the impinging macro-
institutions. T~e extent of such restructuring is variable, 
and the means of reorganizing relationships between a hunting 
society and macro-societies necessarily involve the creation 
and introduction of new institutions. [emphasis mine]. 
If one were to subscribe to Feit's supposition, it would follow that a 
sufficiently serious threat directed at the local resource base would 
function as a catalytic event capable of eliciting a political response. 
Further, one would expect to see an attempt to mitigate such a threat 
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through the establishment of locally controlled political structures of a 
type judged most acceptable to the nation-state. 
The year 1960, as previously illustrated, found the Inuit totally devoid 
-of institutional structures capable of dealing effectively with conflicts 
initiated by the intrusions of the nation-state. From the perspective of 
1988, it is possible to identify Inuit controlled regional government of 
one form or another administering or about to be .-administering virtually 
all of their traditional territory, the two exceptions being the southern 
half of Alaska's Seward Peninsula and a section of Canada's northeast coast 
of Labrador. 
Reflecting the differences in the historical circumstances governing 
the actions of each group's respective nation-state, the .form taken by 
these regional governments has been varied. They consist at present of two 
regional boroughs established under provisions of the Alaska State 
Constitution, one regional municipality under the jurisdiction of the 
Province of Quebec, a supra-regional Home-Rule Government in Greenland 
subject to the Constitution of Denmark, and the imminent establishment of a 
separate Canadian Inuit territory. Though varied in form, the issues 
serving to generate their creation, as well as the processes involved, have 
shown remarkable s~milarity . 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE ALASKAN NORTH SLOPE 
There is little justification for assigning any specific date to the 
beginning of Inuit political development on Alaska's, North Slope: every 
event which occurred was to a large extent dependent on the particular 
series of events which preceded it. It is, however, always convenient to 
anchor a study in time, and to these ends, 1960 is perhaps the most useful 
choice. Long before any event creating unmistakably international 
repercussions occurred, one of more local significance set the stage for 
the movement which was to follow. 
On 31 May 1960, wildlife protection officers of the United States 
Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife arrived in Barrow, Alaska with the 
intention of enforcing the terms of the Migratory Bird Convention Act of 
1916, forbidding the harvest of any migratory species during the spring 
breeding period. The Iflupiat of the Alaskan North Slope had for at least a 
millennium utilized this resource as a source of food and continued to do 
so, despite the long _ignored terms of the Act. To the wildlife officers, 
however, the issue was quite clear : no exception for indigenous people had 
been noted in the Treaty, none would be made. 
They rapidly made several arrests, including that of State 
Representative John Nusungingya, and a number of firearms were confiscated. 
Local response was wholly unexpected: within two days of these initial 
arrests, 138 hunters, representing a substantial portion of the adult male 
Iftupiat population of Barrow and each in possession of an illegally taken 
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duck, had turned themselves in for violation of the Treaty (Gallagher, 
1974: 106-7). After much consternation on the part of the Fish and Wildlife 
officials involved, charges against the violators were dropped, though not 
before the Ifiupiat had been warned that future violations would result in 
prosecution. 
During this same period similar arrests had occurred in the Canadian 
Northwest Territories, but there the outcome had -0een decidedly different, 
the charges dismissed by Judge Sissons of the Territorial Court on the 
grounds that the "Migratory Birds Convention Act of 1916 had nd application 
to Natives hunting for food ... <op.cit.: 108-9)." In Alaska, however, the 
issue, al though legally unresolved, had made it abundantly clear that the 
Ifiupiat's traditional right to utilize subsistence resources faced its 
first significant threat. 
The Barrow 'duck-in', as this event has come to be known, was somewhat 
of a turn:i.ng point in Alaskan Ifiupiat history, as it represented their 
first effective use of direct public pressure and protest to obtain local, 
largely cultural objectives. It was a lesson which once learned was not 
forgotten. Virtually contemporaneous with the Barrow 'duck-in', another 
event , the United States Atomic Energy Commission's <AEC> ' Project 
Chariot', thr eatened even mo r e immediate and f ar reaching consequences. 
' Project Chariot' was the name given to an experimental atomic blast 
proposed for Ogotoruk Creek in the Cape Thompson region of the Alaskan 
Nor th Slope , approxi mately thirt y miles southeas t of Point Hope . The idea 
involved the 'peaceful' use of atomic power for the construction of an 
artificial deep water harbour <Baker, 1982: 18). A remote northwestern 
Alaskan site had been chosen becaus e of the spa r s ity of the res ident 
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popul ation who even the AEC acknowledged would require mandatory 
relocation .. 
The Village Council of Point Hope understandably objected to this AEC 
-proposal, initially by letter and ultimately in a heated public meeting. 
Their objections centred both on the immediate threat to the animals upon 
which they depended for food as well as on the more long term danger 
presented by the still little understood spread of., radiation through the 
food chain <McBeath and Morehouse, 1980: 25). A spokesman at that time for 
Point Hope, Howard Rock, noted that the representatives of the AEC "did not 
even make a tiny effort to consult the Natives who lived close by and who 
have always used Cape Thompson as a hunting and birding area (cited in 
Arnold, 1976:95)." The controversy ignited by this proposal was 
instrumental in focusing the previously dormant political activism which 
was to blossom on the North Slope, and to it can be directly traced the 
roots of th~ founding of the Northwest Alaska Native Association in 1966 
<Burch, 1984 : 315) . In the face of growing public awareness and opposition, 
the project was ultimately abandoned. 
3.1 The Land Claims Movement 
I n an attempt to resolve these and other closely related issues , the 
I ~up i at o f the Nor th Slope established the f irst regional Native 
organizati on t o be f ounded in Al a s ka for over half a cen tury, I nupia t 
Pai tot (the People's Heritage), with Guy Okakok of Barrow as 1 ts first 
president. From the beginning their priority was land, with their initial 
statement of policy centred on the protection of "aboriginal land and 
hunting rights (McBeath and Morehouse, 1980: 41 >." With this in mind, it is 
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hardly surprising that their second meetir.g (Kotzebue in 1962) focused 
primarily on the development of strategies which might serve to mitigate 
the threats posed to their subsistence way of life <Arnold, 1976: 98) . 
It must be recognized that the land claims movement was far more than 
just another episode in the political development process: it was perhaps 
the sole issue around which Iflupiat leaders could effectively mobilize the 
entire population. This conflict functi oned as a 1earning experienc e, as 
well, and the success of the rn.upiat in their later movement to establish 
the North Slope Borough can be attributed largely to the expertise which it 
coincidentally imparted <McBeath and Morehouse, 1980:39-40). 
The most immediate threat to It'lupint land stemmed from the ongoing 
selections of the Alaska state government, imposed under the terms of the 
Alaska Statehood Act. This Act had authorized the new State government to 
select and obtain title to 41.7 million hectares of land from the public 
domain, land which for the most part was already being heavily utilized by 
Alaska's indigenous peoples <Hunt, 1976:159). In 1966 the newly created 
Iflupiat organization, the Arctic Slope Native Association <ASNA) responded 
to this threat by counter-filing a claim encompassing virtually all of 
Alaska nor th of the Brooks Range, demanding full title to 23. 5 million 
hectar es based on thei r aboriginal use and occupancy <Arnold , 1976 : 111) . 
ASNA was not long content to proceed solely through the cour t s , 
attack i ng the issue from other di rections as well. In one of the its first 
officia l act s , f or example , its leadership proposed the f ormation of an 
independent Native political party , an idea which, while not gaining wide 
support, was effective at stimulating Iflupiat participation in the 
electoral process <McBeath and Morehouse, 1980:42). This idea of entering 
the state political arena can be attributed to the influence of two of the 
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most active of ASNA's leaders: Charles Edwardson, the driving force in its 
early development and Eben Hopson, the t~en incumbent Alaskan State Senator 
representing the North Slope. Under such leadership, ASNA was to bec ome the 
vehicle for both land claims and borough formation on the North Slope, 
seizing the initiative in a campaign which was never allowed to falter. 
Following the selection of suitable North Slope lands, Alaska lost 
little time moving to let them for petroleum exploration and development. 
ASNA rapidly responded, filing a petition in United States District Court 
on behalf of the Iflupiat to stop further State action Cop.cit. :45-46). The 
basis of their legal action lay in Section 8 of the Organic Act of 1884 
which required that "Indians or other persons in said district shall not be 
disturbed in the possession of any lands actually now in their use of 
occupation or now claimed by them." Section 4 of the Alaska Statehood Act 
of 1959 expressed similar provisions, requiring that "the State and its 
people . . . forever disclaim all rights and title . . . to any lands or other 
property . . . the right and title to which may be held by Indians, Eskimos 
or Aleuts." Together the evidence seemed strongly supportive of the 
Iflupiat' s stand. 
By the end of 1966, responsibility for the land claims struggle had 
been passed to a n~w statewide Native group, established to co-ordinate the 
claims of all Alaska's indigenous peoples, the Alaska Federation of Natives 
<AFN), to whose work can be lar gely attributed the Alaska Native Claims 
Se ttl emen t Ac t <ANCSA ) of 1971 . While the ASNA was an active participant in 
this process , the relationship between the two groups was frequently 
adversarial, due to differing perceptions of the priorities involved. 
ASNA remained active in its stand for a settlement emphasizing the 
recognition of aboriginal title rather than one limited to compensation for 
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land title extinguishment. While their absolute victories were few, they 
were able to exert a strong influence . on the process. It was only when 
faced with ASNA's threat of withdrawal from the organization, for example, 
that AFN increased its land entitlement demands from 16.2 to 24.3 million 
hectares <op.cit. :50). The last minute inclusion of provisions basing land 
selection on the extent of land forfeited, rather than on a per capita 
basis, can be seen as a major victory for ASNA a9 well, as lacking this 
provision and considering the area's extremely limited resident population, 
the ASNA entitlement could have been one of the smallest regional 
distributions <Arnold, 1976:257). 
The settlement ultimately awarded to the Arctic Slope Regional 
Corporation (ASRC>, the regional corporation created out of ASNA under the 
terms of the Act, totalled 1. 6 million hectares of land and approximately 
$52 million (U.S.> <Morehouse and Leask, 1980:22). While generally heralded 
as the most generous aboriginal claims settlement up to its time, the Act 
left many Ifiupiat concerns unresolved, a result which had become apparent 
even before negotiations were concluded. 
It had become obvious, for example, that the sole aspect of their claim 
to be favourably addressed was that specifically devoted to land ownership 
and even this onl_y so far as was judged necessary to clear the legal 
obstacles then obstructing intrusive development. Of even greater concern 
were the finalized terms of Section 4 (c), which stated: 
All aboriginal titles, if any, and claims of aboriginal title 
in Alaska based on use and occupancy, including submerged land 
underneath all water areas, both inland and offshore, and 
including any aboriginal hunting and fishing rights that may 
exist, are hereby extinguished. [emphasis mine]. 
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As the protection of the traditional rights to subsistence resource 
utilization had been an initiating goal in the land claims process, a 
conclusion extinguishing these rights could hardly be considered a 
favourable outcome. To stime extent, this deficiency was alleviated by 
provisions of the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) 
of 1980, which granted a rural, although not ethnic, preference for 
subsistence resource utilization and created a proeess through which the 
Inuit could participate in hunting and fishing regulati on <Morehouse, 
1988:29). By this time, however, the Iffupiat had already sought and located 
a different forum through which to pursue their objectives. 
3.2 The North Slope Borough 
The lasting effects of the land claims movement were as much if not 
more a function of the leadership abilities which it coincidentally 
imparted as of the benefits explicitly received. This was most clearly 
manifested in the creation of the North Slope Borough. 
As early as 1966 the directors of the ASNA had discussed the idea of 
f or mi ng a bor ough government on the North Slope but little initial progress 
was possible due to_ the clearly recognizabl e lack of a supporting tax base 
<Morehouse et al. , 1984 : 141). Following the 1968 petroleum discovery at 
Prudhoe Bay, however , it became obvious that such a tax base, both large 
and s t a bl e, woul d soon be available . The f i r s t Nor th Slope oil and gas 
lease sale strengthened this perception, bringing approximately $900 
million to the State treasury, while contributing nothing to the resident 
Iffupiat of the North Slope. The time had clearly arrived f or change if the 
Iffupiat were to capture even minimal local economic benefit fr om North 
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Slope deve lopment. Borough i ncorporation was thus seized as a l ogical 
me t hod of obtaining such Ii'iupiat control (Morehouse and Leask , 1980 : 22). 
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Source: Morehouse and Leask, 1980:20. 
The controversy which surrounded the movement to incorp~rate a borough 
on the North Slope near l y exceeded even that of the land c l aims movement 
itself and brought the I flupiat immediate l y int o conflict with both Al as kan 
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s ta te gove rnmen t and the oil companies who planned the development of North 
Sl ope pr operty. The State hoped to restrict access to potential oil 
revenues, reserving them for general distribution. The oil companies 
understandably sought to minimize their prospective tax liabilities 
(op.cit. : 22). An extended legal battle ensued, ultimately resolved in 
favour of borough formation . 
The North Slope Borough (NSB), encompassing th& entire 228,000 square 
kilometre area of the Alaskan Arctic Slope, was finally incorporated in 
1972 with Eben Hopson as its first Mayor. Its access to the oil property 
tax of the Prudhoe Bay development endowed it sufficiently so that by the 
early 1980s it had successfully fielded a $ 1 bi~lion dollar capital 
improvements program and prospered under its full employment economy based 
primaril y on borough jobs . 
As a ' Home Rule' Borough, t he NSB was allowed by the Alaska state 
constitution to "exercise all legislative powers not pr ohibited by law or 
by char ter <Ar ticle X, Section 1). " Among the area-wide power s which it 
consequen t l y assumed wer e those of educat i on , taxa t ion , planning and 
zoni ng, hea t ing , water , l i br ary, trans it , a i r por t , housing , s treet s and 
sidewalks, sewer, flood control, hea l th , s ol id wast e and urban renewal 
(Morehouse et al., 1984:51-54). 
At the local hearings conduc t ed t o revi ew the or i ginal petition of 
incorporation, the I~upiat had expressed over-riding concern regarding the 
manner and extent to which valued customs and practices, especially those 
relating to subsistence pursuits, were threatened by the intrusions of both 
state government and anticipated oil development. Many of the policies of 
the Borough Government have shown a clear devotion to the amelioration of 
these early concerns. 
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Following a move by the Alaskan Department of Fish and Game to close 
the North Slope to caribou hunting in 1976, the NSB responded by creating 
their own borough-wide fish and game board, instrumental in persuading the 
state to reopen the area in 1977. When the International Whaling Commission 
<IWC) called for a ban on the aboriginal hunting of bowhead whales in 1977 
as the result of a survey indicating a decline in the species population, 
the NSB mounted a vigorous campaign of protest, resul~ing in the formation 
of the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission and the eventual establishment of a 
quota system which allowed the Iflupiat to continue their · traditional 
subsistence harvest (op.cit.:89-90). 
Perhaps the clearest reflection of the NSB' s pragmatic approach to 
these issues can be seen in this 1977 statement by then borough mayor Eben 
Hopson: 
The basis of the Eskimo culture of the North Slope Borough is 
vested in subsistence pursuits. In fact, the absence of 
subsistence would unquestionably mean the destruction of the 
Iflupiat culture. Natural resource extraction provides the 
present and only foreseeable future means of local self-
determination and an improved level of living for the indigenous 
peoples of the North Slope. Environmental safeguards are 
essential to protect .the habitat which nurtures subsistence 
resources while, at the same time, enabling the extraction of 
natural resources to provide a cash income (cited in Banks, 
1983: 175 >. 
Political development on the North Slope may have climaxed with the 
establishment of the North Slope Borough, but it certainly did not end 
there. The recently announced formation of a new Arctic borough, adopting 
the boundaries of the NANA Regional Corporation, can be traced to identical 
political, economic and social goals. With the development of the Red Dog 
Mine near Kivalina, widely heralded as the richest lead-zinc deposit in the 
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world, the If'iupiat of the northwest coast have captured a similar, though 
far more limited, tax base to that which has so successfully supported the 
NSB. What impact this development will ultimately bring to the regi on's 
If'iupiat remains to be seen. 
3.3 Commentary 
The Alaskan Ifiupiat, more perhaps than any other Inuit group, have 
encouraged intrusive natural resource development and have seized it as a 
source of revenue and power. Through the delaying tactics of the court s , 
they and Alaska's other native groups, successfully parleyed the petroleum 
discovery at Prudhoe Bay into the first major aboriginal land claims 
settlement in the North. Despite the compensatory limits of this 
settlement, the If'iupiat were successful at utilizing Beaufort Sea 
development to provide funding sufficient to support the political 
aspirations of the remainder of the region. Current plans to extend 
petroleum development into the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge <ANWR> have 
met with similar If'iupiat encouragement, despite the importance of its 
s~bsistence resources to the Barter Island village of Kaktovik. 
As the result o~ careful Iftupiat attention, the detrimental social and 
ecological impacts of oil development have remained relatively localized 
and have had no significant effect on traditionally utilized subsistence 
patterns. While danger posed by further oil development, especially in the 
form of off- shore drilling, remains high, the NSB has sought and received 
important concessions, only one example being the regulation of the timing 
of off-shore drilling so as to avoid potential disturbance of the migrating 
whale population. 
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As the Inuit' s first attempt at regional self-government, the NSB has 
played a crucial role in the export of political aspirat i ons to other Inuit 
groups. Its universally acknowledged achievements in this area include the 
extensive assistance which it has provided to both Canadian and Greenlandic 
Inuit organizations in support of their struggles for land and self-
determination and the instrumental role which it played in the 
establishment of the Inuit Circumpolar ConfereRce <ICC) , currently 
maintaining a presence in the international arena through its United 
Nations observer status. 
< 32 > 
CHAPTER FOUR . 
THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNGAVA PENINSULA 
The 1960s witnessed a nearly exponential increase in the degree of 
governmental intervention experienced by the Ungava PeRinsula Inuit. The 
growing rivalry between the federal and the provincial governments over 
control of the region's potential resource wealth had resulted in the 
establishment of parallel administrative bureaucracies, each attempting to 
supplant the other and both to a large extent antagonizing local residents 
who could not fail to recognize the inefficiency and social cost created by 
such duplication. Although, given the choice, most Inuit would have elected 
to have remained under the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal 
government, Quebec rapidly consolidated its control over the area, a move 
viewed as a primary motivation for the subsequent establishment in 1971 of 
the Northern Quebec Inuit Association (NQIA) (D'Anglure, 1984:685-86). 
Within months of its initial organization, the NQIA was faced with its 
greates t challenge. 
4.1 The James Bay Conflict 
Despite the fact that Quebec had announced tentative plans to develop 
hydro-electric sites in the north as early as .1956, it was not until the 
1960s that advances in high voltage, long distance transmission techniques 
first made it truly feasible to transmit power from large generating 
projects to industrial centres in the south <Rae, 1976: 11). This advance 
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was largely responsible for Qu~bec's decision to initiate the development 
of its potential power resources as a provincial policy. As Quebec had 
achieved major economic progress through its initial at tempts at hydro-
electric construction, a similar though more massive project at James Bay 
in the 1970's followed as a logical extension of that development 
philosophy <Richardson, 1975: 22). 
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As announced in 1971, the project proposed damming or diverting 
virtually all the major rivers draining the east side of James Bay, 
directly impacting an area of approximately 340,000 square kilometres. Two 
separate development stages were originally conceived, a southern one 
involving the diversion of the Nottaway and Broadback rivers into the 
Rupert River, and a northern one in which waters of" the Eastmain, Great 
Whale, and Caniapiscau rivers were to be diverted into the La Grande River. 
Eventually the southern project was abandoned as a result of unfavourable 
engineering studies. On the northern, however, a total of four dams were to 
be constructed, creating four huge reservoirs which together would flood an 
area of approximately 8800 square kilometres, a greater than fourfold 
increase in the surface water of the region. Levels of even existing lakes 
within the project area were expected to be raised between four and twenty 
metres. The project was projected to have on completion an electrical 
generating capacity of approximately 8000 megawatts (Gill and Cooke , 
1974: 121-122) . 
When the government of Quebec announced the impending development of 
James Bay, it s Inuit and Cree residents were caught nearly completely 
unprepared. A vast p_ercentage of territory traditionally utilized by the 
these native peoples for subsistence activities was to be inundated. While 
there had never been any settlement of land claims in the region , claims 
had been made and both groups r egarded portions of the territory invol ved 
as their own, based largely on historic use and occupancy. They were 
astounded that their rights and claims to these lands could have been so 
blatantly ignored. The plans for this project and the manner of their 
announcement effectively demonstrated to them that the government of Quebec 
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believed either that its native peoples possessed no aboriginal rights, or 
that if such rights did exist, were subordinate to the province 's right to 
develop wheresoever it might choose <Diamond, 1985: 266- 267). 
It was obvious to the Inuit and Cree that the project would have a 
devastating impact on their way of life. Above the dams, flooding would 
cause a substantial loss in habitat of particular importance to the two 
most productively trapped furbearers, beaver and muskrat, as well as other 
mammals, including moose. This flooding would also interfere with the 
migration routes of the caribou, a staple of both groups' diet. Fish 
populations would be affected by the project as well, with the destruction 
of most major spawning grounds, the damming of migration routes and the 
nitrogen saturation of waters located below the dams <Gill and Cooke, 
1974: 123). 
The NQIA, in association with Cree organizations, rapidly initiated a 
legal response to the project in an attempt to stop or delay its progress, 
at least until their land claim questions had been adequately addressed 
<McPherson, 1979: 43). The lawyers for the Quebec government attempted to 
have their application for an interlocutory injunction dismissed 
immediately on the grounds that neither of the native groups possessed any 
aboriginal rights wriatsoever <Diamond, 1985: 269). The groups responded by 
quoting the terms of the Quebec Boundaries Extension Act of 1912, through 
which the area in question was initially transfered to Quebec's 
jurisdiction. The Act included a condition similar to that. which had been 
included in Alaska's Organic Act of 1884, requiring that the province 
"recognize the rights of the ... inhabitants of the territory" and that it 
"obtain surrenders of such rights (cited in Rostaing, 1984: 10)". An 
extended legal battle ensued. 
4.2 The James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement 
On 11 November 1975, the James Bay and Northern Qu~bec Agreement 
<JBNQA) was finally reached. Through it, Quebec successfully extinguished 
aboriginal rights over an area encompassing four-fifths of its provincial 
domain and at the same time removed a major imped1ment to any future 
resource development schemes <Rostaing, 1984: 15). Unsurprisingly, the terms 
of the Agreement were far from favourable to Quebec's native people. As it 
was obvious from the negotiations' inception that there was no possibility 
of eliminating the project, the Inuit and Cree were forced to bargain in a 
manner which would minimize their losses. In achieving these ends they were 
moderately successful. 
The JBNQA awarded to community corporations, to be organized in each 
village under the terms of the Agreement, e.xclusive rights to approximately 
one percent (1%) of the region surrendered (Category I lands). Of greater 
importance, especially in light of early objectives, it recognized the 
Natives' exclusive hunting, fishing and trapping rights over virtually all 
of their traditional territory, an area exceeding 40,000 square kilometres, 
subject to only limited exceptions with regard to conservation and public 
safety. Severe restrictions were placed as well on non-native utilization 
of resources seen as vital to the subsistence user <Diamond, 1985:281). 
Basic monetary compensation awarded the Inuit approached $60 million 
(Canadian), with an additional $30 million secured as indemnity against 
future development projects <D'Anglure, 1984:687). 
The principal power granted to the Inuit was the authority to grant 
leases, servitudes, usufructs and other rights on their Category I lands . 
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This power, however, was far from absolute, with even such bas ic authority 
as local control over public access limited to provincial laws of general 
application. Title was severely restricted as well , with Category I lands 
not freely alienable, other than to the province of Quebec (Bartlett, 
1986:44). 
Compared to the terms of ANCSA which had preceded it, very little land 
was actually transfered into fee title ownership, 
were conveyed and significant restrictions were 
nO' sub-surface rights 
placed on the size , 
location and timing of all future land selections. Final authority over 
intrusive natural resource exploitation was retained by the province as 
well, with Inuit communities lacking any tangible power with which to 
defend against future expropriation (op.cit. :43-45). 
While the Inuit were empowered to pass regulations with respect to 
hunting, fishing and trapping quotas, this potential authority was 
circumscribed by powers retained both by the f ederal and provincial 
governments. It is clear that the Agreement did not intend to transfer any 
measure of 'real' authority over game management to the Inuit or, 
ultimately, any control over the subsistence activities they had sought to 
defend. 
The outcome of d_isputes regarding management of offshore areas was 
particularly unsatisfying. Because these areas were not transfered to 
Quebec under the terms of the Boundaries Extension Act, they remained under 
the jurisdiction of the NWT and were therefore not subject to the terms of 
the Agreement. As late as 1981, the Quebec Inuit ' s Makivik Corporation 
< 1981: 48) continued to press the federal government for some measure of 
local control, arguing that "lnui t dependence upon marine resources and 
Inuit interest in economic ventures relating to renewable and non-renewable 
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resour ces must be recognized by Canada as a basis for meaningful 
negot i ations of Inuit claims in this area . " 
In an area in which it showed clear superiority to ANCSA, the JBNQA did 
make limited political concessions. Both local and regional governments 
were created within the framework of the provincial government of Quebec 
which, though non-ethnic by statute, are currently under de facto native 
control and are likely to remain that way for some ~ime due to an imposed 
special length-of-residence requirement on non-natives <Morehouse, 
1987: 18). The specific nature of these governmental structures will be 
discussed in greater detail in the following section, but it is enough to 
say that they remain the only political concessions which have been granted 
as a result of a Native claims process to date. 
4.3 The Kativik Regional Government 
As early as 1970, community leaders from the northern Ungava Peninsula 
had called for the creation of an autonomous area in control of its own 
regional government, requests which were repeated during a meeting of Inuit 
r epresenta ti ves with Gilles Masse, the Minister of Natural Resources for 
Quebec , in 1971 (Simard and Duhaime, 1981 : 130) . Until the James Bay 
negotiations , however , these requests f or political autonomy had been f o r 
the mos t par t ignored. 
I ncluded wi thin the J BNQA was a Draft Act Respec t ing Cer t ain 
Municipalities and the Regional Government of North ern Quebec, which in its 
finalized form of 23 June 1978 was res ponsible f or the creati on of the 
Kativik Regional Government (KRG) <Bartlett, 1986: 49). A non- ethnically 
defined public administration, the KRG was granted jurisdiction over the 
< 39 > 
resources must be recognized by Canada as a basis for meaningful 
negotiations of Inuit claims in this are~." 
In an area in which it showed clear superiority to ANCSA, the JBNQA did 
make limited political concessions. Both local and regional governments 
were created within the framework of the provincial government of Quebec 
which, though non-ethnic by statute, are currently under de facto native 
., 
control and are likely to remain that way for some time due to an imposed 
special length-of-residence requirement on non-natives <Morehouse, 
1987: 18). The specific nature of these governmental structures will be 
discussed in greater detail in the following section, but it is enough to 
say that they remain the only political concessions which have been granted 
as a result of a Native claims process to date. 
4.3 The Kativik Regional Government 
As early as 1970, community leaders from the northern Ungava Peninsula 
had called for the creation of an autonomous area in control of its own 
regional government, requests which were repeated during a meeting of Inuit 
representatives with Gilles Masse, the Minister of Natural Resources for 
Quebec, in 1971 (Simard and Duhaime, 1981: 130). Until the James Bay 
negotiations, however, these requests for politic al autonomy had been for 
the most part ignored . 
Included within the JBNQA was a Draft Act Respecting Certain 
Municipalities and the Regional Government of Northern Quebec, which in its 
finalized form of 23 June 1978 was responsible for the creation of the 
Kativik Regional Government <KRG) <Bartlett, 1986: 49). A non-ethnically 
defined public administration, the KRG was granted jurisdiction over the 
< 39 > 
entire a r ea of Qu~bec lying north of the 55th parallel, a geographic a1· ea 
larger than France (Map 4). Al though the KRG' s powers and jurisdiction 
r eflect only limited autonomy, the Qu~bec Inuit did gain an instrument with 
which they could control certain key aspects of their collecti~e life. The 
KRG has provided a focal point for the region's political and 
administrative activity, as well as a forum that has encouraged the 
... 
discussion of local and regional issues <Rostaing, 1984:35) . 
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Map 4. The Kativik Region 
Source: Rostaing , 1984: 7. 
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Its basic structure consists ~fa regional corporation administered by 
a council of representatives drawn from the ranks of the local municipal 
councils. On a regional level it exercises some degree of author! ty over 
local administration, justice, the environment, economic development, 
health and social services, taxation, planning, transportation, 
communications and education. Three governing boards were created to 
administer programs and services, including the Kativik Health and Social 
Services Council, The Kativik School Board and the Kativik Regional 
Development Council. 
Local municipal government benefited from this Act as well. Under Part 
1, thirteen communities became municipal corporations governed by elected 
councils exercising authority over such things as licensing and contracts, 
public security, public health and hygiene, town planning and lands, public 
services <roads, water, etc), finance and taxation . While the advantages 
that such a locally controlled government offers over the status qua are 
substantial, the KRG has not been without problems. 
Kati vik' s lack of a secure local financial base has compelled it to 
channel much of its energy toward the south, to the detriment of its own 
resident population. ~l though it is a public government with the inherent 
power to levy property taxes, such power is meaningless in light of its 
lack of a local tax base. As a result, funding is problematic, to a large 
extent determined by provincial priorities rather than local needs (Hawkes 
and Peters, 1986: 8). This problem remains chronic, with executives f orced 
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to spend up to one-half of their time negotiating with Quebec City to 
obtain adequate project funding. It is not inaccurate to conclude, as did 
Rostaing (1984: 35), that Kativik, in the context of the massively 
subsidized economy of the James Bay region, is primarily a modification of 
Inuit dependence rather than the source of its elimination. 
4.5 Commentary 
Of all the threads of Inuit political development, that of the Ungava 
Peninsula is certainly least representative of a locally initiated process. 
Unlike that of the North Slope, the east-central Canadian Arctic or that of 
Greenland, negotiations were ongoing even as the first Inuit association 
sought to consolidate local opposition. The Quebec Inuit did not drive the 
process, as elsewhere, but instead were dr1.ven by it. 
Despite this fact, certain aspects of the JBNQA do stand as significant 
achievements, particularly those provisions granting recognition and 
protection to the area's distinctive subsistence economy. The value which 
the Inuit have placed on this achievement may be demonstrated by the 
inclusion of similar provisions within the more clearly negotiated terms of 
the Western Arctic Settlement Act of 1984 , as will be illustrated in the 
following chapter . 
Political concessions were gran ted as well, which remain unique in 
their having r esulted f r om the negotiation pr ocess . This fact, howeve r , 
should not be over emphasized. Although the Kativik Regional Government 
does offer its Inuit certain tangibl e advantages over the politi ca l st a t us 
quo, the widespread enthusiasm which greet ed its creati on seems now t o have 
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been largely unjustified. As the Agreement guaranteed no unique ethno-
poli tical rights, it offers no lasting advantage over any other public 
<i.e. non-e thnic) regional government within Inuit control, as for example 
the North Slope Borough, and in reality does not even approach that level 
of autonomy due to the latter ' s independent sources of funding. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE WESTERN CANADIAN ARCTIC 
Beginning in 1965, conflict over resources increased in the western and 
central Canadian Arctic along lines similar to those previously experienced 
on the Alaskan North Slope. In Tuktoyaktuk, f or example, residents were 
involved in a dispute with an oil company regarding the pl~cement of 
seismic lines which had dammed most of the creek s fl owing into the local 
har bour . Problems were evident on Banks Island as well, with oil 
exploration leases granted despit e the federal government's previous 
assurances of pr otection for subsistence ut i li zation <McPhe r son, 1979: 59-
60) . As in Alaska, these early examples of resource conflict served as 
usef ul rallying points around which Inuit l eaders successfully organized 
l ocal opposi ti on int o a regi onal Native r i ghts movemen t. 
5.1 The Committee for the Original Peoples' Entitlement 
The fir s t such_ organization to develop was the Commit tee for the 
Original Peopl es' Entitl ement (COPE), established in Inuvik, NWT on 28 
January 1970 by nineteen Inuit who had identified a pressing need f or a 
native rights organization run for and by native people. Two main factors 
served to initiate this event: first, the growing success of Alaska ' s 
Natives in their negotiations for a land claims settlement; and second, the 
newly announced discovery of oil at Atkinson Point, deep within their own 
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sector of the Canadian Arctic CUsher, 1973: 20). COPE' s initially stated 
objectives were to: 
a) provide a united voice for all original peoples of the N.W.T., 
and 
b) work for the establishment and the realization of the rights 
of the original peoples <op.cit. :22). 
As with the Iftupiat of the North Slope, an early priority was placed on 
the question of land entitlement. COPE viewed the western portion of the 
Canadian Arctic as their own by virtue of their extended occupancy (1. e. 
aboriginal t1 tle), and as they had never relinquished it as the result of 
war, treatied it away or sold it, it must remain theirs to do with as they 
might choose. They felt that they needed a settlement which would both 
guarantee them control over the land in their possession, as well as 
compensate them for any which had been or might in the future be 
appropriated by others <op.cit. :26). 
Land, however, was not the sole item on COPE's early agenda and they 
rapidly expanded their activities into other areas of the cultural, social, 
and economic life of their constituency as well. One early example was 
their initiation of the Northern Games, what they envisaged as an 
opportunity not only for the residents of the North to join together 
socially, but also for the expression of their own unique cultural 
tradition. COPE also took positive action in support of native language 
use , obtaining a contract to provide radio broadcasts in Inuktitut , and was 
active in the collection of the oral histories of its elders. Local native 
business ventures profited as well, with COPE playing a leading role in the 
establishment of Namaktok Limited, a native corporation designed to assist 
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native people in the establishment of their own businesses (op.cit. :32-33). 
One of COPE's most notable achievements . was its organization of the 
Conference of Arctic Native Peoples, held in Coppermine, NWT in the summer 
of 1970. This conference resulted in the first truly collective action of 
the Canadian Inuit, a statement forwarded to the Prime Minister demanding 
recognition of their aboriginal rights <op.cit. :29). 
Early in its history COPE found itself under , heavy pressure to 
concentrate effort on the negotiation of a land claims settlement in the 
Western Arctic where resource development and exploration had become 
especially active (Vallee et al. , 1984: 670). As a result, COPE chose to 
reduce the scope of its activities, with many of its previous functions 
other than those pertaining specifically to regional Inuvialuit land 
claims, assumed by the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada (to be discussed in 
Chapter 7). COPE in turn became a regional affiliate of this latter 
organization, a change which allowed them to concentrate their limited 
resources on those local issues best handled through Inuvik. This activity 
culminated in May 1977 with their submission of a comprehensive claim 
covering most of Canada's Western Arctic Region . 
Thei r clai m called fo r maximum control on Inuvialuit lands through fee 
simple ownership alon~ wi th adequa t e protection through improved land use 
planning on all lands , including those which were to r emain public <COPE , 
1977 : 12) . In add! tion , they asked for exclusive rights to the harvest of 
animals , protect i on f or tradit i ona l harvesting methods and a guarantee of 
access to the whole Western Arctic Region for hunting, trapping and fishing 
(op.cit.:6-7). 
By 1979, an agreement in principle had been reached between COPE and 
Canada, but a change in the federal government and a reduction in the 
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degree of de ve l opment pressure resulting from the outcome of the Mackenzie 
Valley Pipeline Inquiry, delayed approval of .a final settlement until 1984 
<Morehouse, 1987:19). 
5.2 The Inuvialuit Settlement 
The COPE agreement was finally ratified under tile Western Arctic 
(Inuvialuit) Settlement Act <WASA) of 1984, but like ANCSA, this settlement 
fell far short of satisfying the goals sought by the 1977 proposal. In 
their original claim, the Inuvialuit had listed cultural identity, 
political authority, compensation for rights foregone and protection of 
subsistence resources and the environment, all as necessary components of a 
successful agreement <op.cit. :20). Although rights conveyed by the Act were 
limited to the latter two, . even this may be considered a success when 
compared to the terms of ANCSA, basically limited to compensation alone. 
The Inuvialui t were awarded approximately $90 million (Canadian) in 
instalments to be paid through 1997, the actual amount adjusted to reflect 
inflationary trends <Duffy, 1988: 256) . Si x of the area's Inuit villages 
wer e granted fee simple ti t le, including that of sub-surface minerals, to 
blocks of approximately _ 1800 square kilomet r es each . At Cape Bathur st a 
block of nearly 2100 square kilometres was granted, pursuant to the 
Agreement's clause 7<1><a><ii). In addition, a further 78,000 square 
kilome tres was awa r ded which e xcluded mine r al rights . <Canada , 1984 : 5) . 
While the agreement provided the Inuvialuit with limited authority for the 
administration of thei r own lands, it l eft no doubt as to their ulti ma te 
subjugation to larger ter ritorial and federal jurisdiction. 
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7. (97 > Except as otherwise provided .in this Agreement, 
Inuvialuit lands shall be subject to the laws of general 
application applicable to private lands from time to time 
in force, including, without restricting the general1,_t y 
of the foregoing, territorial laws and ordinances that 
apply or are made to apply generally to private lands 
<op. ci t.: 13). 
In addition to the land, the Inuvialui t were also , awarded substantial 
subsistence rights, including exclusive harvest rights to game and fur-
bearers on their own lands as well as in the National and Territorial Parks 
to be established on the Yukon Arctic coastal plain. These rights excluded, 
however, the management of wildlife, as was the case with the JBNQA 
remaining subject to the laws of general application. Al though ultimate 
authority for set ting of quotas remained with the federal government, a 
stipulation did require that the government consider the recommendations of 
the Wildlife Management Advisory Councils of the Yukon and the Northwest 
Territories, each of which included Inuit representation. 
One positive aspect of the Act was its recognition of the Inuvialuit's 
right to set their own standards for environmental 
Specifically, it provided: 
7. (99) Where the Inuvialuit dispose of new rights 
respecting oil , gas, coal, minerals, sand and gravel 
and rock on Inuvialuit lands, the Inuvialuit Land 
Administration may set terms and conditions with respect 
to the environment and safety that equal or exceed the 
standards provided for under the laws of general 
application <op.cit.: 13). 
This authority was rapidly utilized. 
protection. 
In December of 1985 the Inuvialuit and Essa Resources negotiated a new 
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lease with respect to oil development on the Tuktoyaktuk Peninsula. The 
terms of this lease awarded to the Inuvialuit a signing bonus of $1 million 
<Canadian) plus an annual access fee of $200, OOO and advance royalty 
payments exceeding $450, OOO. As negotiated, it required that Esso comply 
with regulations regarding surface restoration and environmental protection 
and made significant advances toward minimizing potential impact on 
hunting, fishing and trapping activities (Bartlett, 198.6: 80). 
5.3 Commentary 
Due to the native claims process in the Western Canadian Arctic 
occurring for the most part subsequent to that of ANCSA and the JBNQA, it 
is not surprising that its settlement included some of the more popular 
provisions of each. Like ANCSA but unlike the JBNQA, WASA awarded sub-
surface as well as surface rights to select areas of land, greatly 
enhancing the Inuit' s potential ability to capture any economic benefit 
resulting from . future development projects. 
WASA substantially buttressed Inuit access 
Like JBNQA but unlike ANCSA, 
and rights to traditional 
subsistence resources, thereby countering many of the concerns which are 
viewed as having initially motivated the Inuit's political response . 
As had been the case with ANCSA, the Inuit were unsuccessful in their 
attempts to negotiate a political component into the settlement, but also 
like ANCSA , t he set t lement has neither satisfied nor proved the end of 
their pol itical aspirati ons: an unbroken thread stretches from the 
foundation of COPE to the still vital movement seeking the pol itical 
division of the NWT. Although their role in the current process is 
secondary to that of the Inuit Tapirisat and frequently in conflict with 
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it, the Inuvialui t have been successful in gaining the inclusion of a 
provision within the most recent Nunavut .Proposal in support of the concept 
of a semi-autonomous municipal government in their own Western Arctic CNCF, 
1987 :3-4). Negotiations continue. 
CHAPTER SIX 
-THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF GREENLAND 
The close of the 1950s brought changes to Greenland similar to those 
which had been witnessed in Alaska and Canada. The wor~d was changing and 
the climate of the times brought increasing opposition, internal as well as 
external, to the colonial nature, however benevolent, of the Danish 
administration. Greater Inuit participation in the island's administrati on 
was a viewed as the primary means of countering such opposition and so 
followed as a logical response. 
6 . 1 The Greenland Committee of 1960 
At the Provincial Council meeting of 1959, a strategy was developed 
which 1 t was thought .would effectively implement this policy by leading to 
a ' normalization' of the Danish / Greenlandic relationship (1 . e . the full 
integration of Greenland into the Kingdom of Denmark). Its first goal 
involved diminishing t ~e authority of the Danish Ministry f or Greenland and 
the subsequent delegation of this power to the Greenlandic Provincial 
Council <Klei van, 1984: 703). In addition, as it was acknowledged that many 
critical i ssues re l at_ed to Green l andi c development r equired further and 
more detailed study, the Greenland Committee of 1960 (G-60) was established 
to pursue those ends . 
The report of G-60, completed in 1964, made two far r eaching deci s i ons 
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which it hoped would facilitate the objectives of Greenlandic development: 
first, that major improvements in the standard of living would r equire the 
currently dispersed population to be concentrated in a minimum of urban 
districts; and second, that the mainstay of Greenland trade would in the 
future be the all - season marine fi~heries and that future investment should 
be a reflection of this fact (Greenland Commission, 1967:2). The former may 
be seen as especially significant within the context of this dissertation. 
Designed as a necessary prerequisite for the trans iti on of the island 
to an industrial pattern of production, the effects of these policies were 
even more far reaching than originally foreseen <Harhoff, 1983: 15). The 
Greenlanders, still for the most part independent hunters and fisherman 
controlling their own means of production, were not to be lured from 
villages to towns solely by the promise of future economic incentives . In 
order to accomplish the required urbanization, less benevolent forms of 
motivation were required: schools and shops in the settlements were closed 
down, home building was suspended, and loans were made only to fishermen 
living in urban areas <Dahl, 1986a:317). Faced with such administrative 
realities, people indeed moved 'voluntarily' from villages to the urban 
centres. The effects of this relocation were predictably devastating: 
It ripped through the established patterns of community life, 
leaving in its wake a socio-psychological landscape littered 
with the remains of norms and traditions, which once effectively 
channelled the social interaction and creativity of the 
community, but now are impotent to control the social process 
in the newly formed population centres (Schuurman, 1976:56). 
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At this point the Danish administration made another far reaching 
decision, an especially ill-timed attempt to define the ownership of the 
island's natural resources. This, the Greenland Mineral Resources Act of 
1965 1 advanced the position that "all mineral resources in Greenland belong 
to the State." Al though it has since been argued that this unfortunate 
choice of words was only an attempt on the part of the~Crown to establish 
the unsubjectability of these resources to private ownership, it was 
generally and unpopularly interpreted in Greenland as a unilateral 
declaration of Danish sovereignty over the resource base. Robert Petersen 
<1975 : 15) noted: 
. .. the Greenland Mining Act maintains that the Greenlandic 
under gr ound (sub- surface] and the miner als in it belongs to 
the Danish State. According to this Act the Minister of 
Greenland has the sole power to give licences . Normally he 
informs and asks the Provincial Council in license questions, 
but according to this Act he has no obligation to listen to 
the Provincial Council and the Greenlanders have no influence 
upon the question [of] who should be Minister of Greenland . 
While the e f fec t s of t his legisl a tion were not i mmed i atel y appa r en t , it to 
a large extent served to set the stage for the conflict which f ollowed and 
has become an enduring theme, even yet unresolved . 
6 . 2 The EEC Conflict 
The referendum of 1972 regarding Danish membership in the European 
Economic Community CEEC) played what can be recognized eas ily as the truly 
catalytic role in the political devel opment process (Dahl, 1986a:320). 
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Greenland , unsurprisingly, viewed incorporation into the EEC as a 
substantial risk to the ultimate achievement of control over their own 
fishing, oil and mineral resources, a goal they viewed as a necessary 
prerequisite for the development of Greenland for the ultimate benefit of 
the Greenlandic people. By this time, it must be remembered, Greenlanders 
were well acquainted with the course of events occurring elsewhere in the 
Arctic, and realized the area they inhabited was in danger of inclusion in 
what Br0sted and Gull0v <1976: 148) have referred to as " the 'feeding 
ground' of the resource hungry Western World especially ~ttracted to 
rich resource areas, the access to which is also considered politically 
secure." 
Although the Greenland referendum on the issue recorded only 28.4% in 
favour of EEC membership, the existing constitutional status of Greenland 
required that these votes be combined with those of the rest of Denmark. 
The final result was Greenland's unwilling inclusion. within the Danish EEC 
membership. For perhaps the first time, the Danish Government had clearly 
engaged in a Greenlandic policy contrary to the wishes of the majority of 
Greenlanders, effectively fueling the growing perception of powerlessness . 
Greenland formally requested that they be allowed to determine their 
relationship with the _EEC independently of Denmark, but this request was 
rejected by Denmark on the grounds that the Treaty of Accession had already 
been signed and because Greenland was deemed to lack the local autonomy 
considered necessary to allow such a separate Greenlandic decision 
<Harhoff, 1983: 17). Local reaction was swift, with the two Greenlandic 
members of the Danish Parliament immediately demanding that the conditions 
governing national unity be revised (Foighel, 1980:5). The movement for 
I 
Home Rule had begun. 
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6.3 The Home Rule Movement 
In the fall of 1972, the Greenland Provincial Council informed the 
Danish Minister for Greenland, that the time had arrived to transfer t o the 
Council greater authority over, and a joint responsibility for, the 
development of Greenland. As the result of this ~equest, the first 
Greenland born Minister for Greenland, Knud Hertling, established a 
Comm! t tee consisting exclusively of Greenlanders to examine in detail the 
question of Home Rule. Having devoted two years to their study, the Home 
Rule Committee finally submitted its report in February, 1975. 
In the interim, Denmark had instituted a number of local reforms. Of 
perhaps the most significance was the delegation of greater power directly 
to the existing municipalities, for the most part bypassing the Provincial 
Council. This was, unfortunately, generally interpreted as an attempt on 
the part of the Danish author! ties to disperse authority in such a way as 
to weaken the political unity of the island as a whole <Dahl, 1986a:319). 
Its subsequent effects were predictably counter-productive. 
Further conflict over resources had surfaced during this period as 
well. In the spring of 1975, Denmark's newly f ormed Social Democratic 
government had granted oil concessions to a group of largely f oreign oil 
companies, covering forty-six blocks off the coast of West Greenland. 
Although a number of prominent Greenlandic politicians had sought a delay 
in such leasing to allow further study, exploration continued (8r0sted and 
Gull0v, 1976: 151). 
That Danish hopes at this time should focus on the exploitation of 
Greenlandic resources is unsurprising, as the State is virtually totally 
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dependent on imports of both energy resources as well as other raw 
materials for its considerable industrial sec tor, In Greenland, however, 
the repercussions surrounding this decision were unexpectedly severe. It 
had unwittingly served both to create local expectations of a different 
future and to fuel the demands for a re-examination of the relationship 
linking Greenland to the Danish State. 
By this time Greenland's first successful poli 1?1.cal party, Siumut 
<Forward), had begun to make its presence felt as well. Founded in 1975 on 
the initiative of the young well-educated '1971 politicians', Jonathan 
Motzfeldt, Lars Emil Johansen and Moses Olsen, it supported the development 
of Greenland only to the degree that it could be made to conform to the 
island's unique social and geographic conditions. Among further goals, it 
sought the strengthening of contacts with other circum-Arctic Inuit groups, 
giving credibility to the name of 'Inui Usm', which has sometimes been 
applied to its political philosophy. Siumut mobilized massive support in 
its objection to the offshore drilling, primarily from the ranks of hunters 
and fishermen seeking to defend the basis of their mode of production 
<Dahl, 1986a : 320) . 
Within si x months, i n October, 1975, the Minister for Greenland , J0rgen 
Peder Hansen, acting o~ the advice o f the Home Rule Committee , established 
the Commission on Home Rule. While not made up exclusively of Greenlanders , 
as had been the afor ementioned Committee , the Commission did ha ve equal 
Gr eenlandi c r epr esenta ti on . It cons i sted of s eve n delegates elected by the 
members of the Danish Parliament from among their own member.s and seven 
Greenlandic delegates, the two Greenlandic members of Parliament and five 
members of the Pr ovincial Council <op. c it.:315). Whil e delibe r a tion 
continued, events in Greenland gathered momentum. 
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A second political party jointed Siumut in 1976, the movement Inuit 
Ataqatigiit (Inuit Brotherhood), founded on the occasion of the first 
aasivik (summer feast). With an initial base of the five hundred young 
people (i.e. one percent of the total population) who had gathered from all 
over Greenland to attend the festival, its major objective was full 
independence, which it championed from a Marxist anti-imperialist platform 
considerably to the left of Siumut (Kleivan, 1984:714). Like Siumut, it 
also strongly opposed oil development. 
In 1977 yet a third party was founded, the movement Atassut (Mutual 
Connection). This group, headed by the chairman of the Provincial Council , 
Lars Chemni tz, sought the development of Greenland in conform! ty with. the 
existing colonial framework, its most clearly expressed political objective 
the maintenance of the relationship then linking Greenland with Denmark 
<op. cit.: 714). With consideration of this fact, it is not surprising that 
Atassut, unlike Siumut and Inuit Ataqatigii t, strongly favoured immediate 
resource devel6pment. 
At this point in the ongoing Home Rule deliberations, the long dormant 
Greenland Mineral Resources Act resurfaced . The Siumut representatives to 
the Provinc i a l Counci 1 spear headed a demand for the ownership of non-
renewable r esour ces to be vested i n the name of "the res i dent popula t ion of 
Greenland ." Comi ng as it did i n the mi ddle of the debate, it was successful 
only at br i ngi ng the process to a standstill <Foighel, 1980 : 9- 11). 
Thi s s t a l emat e was finall y br oken t hrough t he int e r venti on of the 
Danish Prime Minister who emphasized the Crown's opposition to any solution 
placing Danish national territory under less than the full s overeignty of 
the Kingdom. Making it clear that amending the Constituti on was out of the 
question, he implied that the only way in which Greenland could obtain full 
< 59 > 
ownership of its non-renewable resources was by leaving the Commonwealth. 
This presented a difficult dilemma for the Greenlanders. With due 
consideration, however, of the complex relationship of dependency linking 
them to Denmark and the capital transfers which this relationship implied, 
it is not surprising that they selected an alternative which maximized 
their autonomy while allowing them to retain the existing linkage <Kleivan, 
1984:715). Although the potential income prospects crf natural resource 
exploitation were a pleasant dream, they remained far too intangible on 
which to launch an independent future. 
The final impasse involved the identification of a framework which 
might satisfy Greenlandic demands while allowing the retention of ultimate 
Danish sovereignty . To resolve this question, the Commission turned to the 
model established in 1948 regarding Home Rule for the Faroe Islands, an 
arrangement indisputably in conformity with the 1953 Danish Constitution 
and containing no 
island's non-living 
regulations whatsoever regarding ownership of 
resources <Motzfeldt, 1987:40}. Such a course 
the 
was 
proposed and ultimately adopted unamended by the Danish Parliament on 17 
November 1978. On 17 January 1979 the population of Greenland concurred, 
approving by referendum the Home Rule Act in Greenland, effective 1 May 
1979, by a 70.1% margin <Foighel, 1980:4-5}. But what exactly had they 
gained? 
6.4 The Home Rule Government 
Patterson (1976: 115} defined 'Home Rule' as, "that governmental form 
generally typified by a legislative and/or constitutional division of 
authority between a sovereign state and a semi-independent territory which 
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enables the territory to assume complete or majority control of internal 
affairs while the state maintains authority over matters of common and 
international concern." This description, as applied to Greenland, is apt. 
Although the Home Rule State is the highest existing evolution of Inuit 
political control, its sovereignty is stiil far from complete. By no 
stretch of the imagination can Greenland be considered a nation-state, as 
far too much control remains vested in the old colonial power. For a number 
of years to come, this is likely to remain the case. The reason for this is 
obvious: massive Danish funding is still necessary to cover · Greenland's 
public expedi tures <Dahl, 198fia:321). At the time of Home Rule's 
implementation , this expenditure approached 300 million Danish kroner 
annually CKleivan, 1984:716). 
The essence of Home Rule was the transfer of jurisdictional powers from 
Danish authorities to the Home Rule Government within certain prescribed 
areas of regulation and confined, of course, exclusively to Greenlandic 
territory. Some areas of regulation were retained by the Crown, including 
legislation on defence, foreign affairs and monetary policy <Harhoff, 
1983: 18). Among those powers which have been or will be assumed by the Home 
Rule Government are : the organization of local government; taxation; the 
regulation of fish_ing , hunting and reindeer breeding; wildlife 
conservation ; planning; trade; socia l welfare ; educational and cultural 
affairs ; health ser vices ; and , environmental protection . Judicial powers 
have r emai ned subject to the ultimate author ity of the Danish Supreme 
Court. Substantial powers had, in fact passed to Greenlandic control, many 
of those in fact which presented the greatest potential for seri ous 
conflict with the existing mode of production. 
Regarding the natural resource ownership question, the result of the 
negotiations, as expressed by the Greenland Home Rule Act, was vague, 
stating only that the resident population . of Greenland possessed certain 
but undefined ".basic rights" <Greenland, 1978: §8. 1). While the extent of 
these rights has never been conclusively established, a joint management 
scheme was successfully negotiated which enables each party to 
independently exercise final and equal veto power over any proposed 
resource development scheme. Wi th regards to the dis.tribution of public 
revenues derived from such potential exploitation, it has been agreed that 
it shall primarily be utilized to replace Denmark's capital transfers. Any 
future revenues in excess of these transfers are to be allocated according 
to a schedule of distribution, to date still undetermined <Harhoff, 
1983: 19). 
Kleivan (1979:20), among others, has viewed this solution as 
particularily problematic, a virtual guarantee of future conflict. He 
recognized that " . . . the people of Greenland with its present political 
consciousness will be unable ever to accept that a European power 
participate in the control over its resources. 11 Because of the enduring 
nature of the traditional economy, the opportunities suggested by 
commercial resource exploitation and the potentially mutual exclusivity of 
the two, Gr eenlandic ~ontrol over the resource base remains as critical as 
ever <Br0sted and Gull0v , 1977:82). 
One issue commonly agreed upon by all parties was that the new system 
should r esult i n neither savings nor in extra expenses for the government 
of Denmark. Prior to Home Rule, detailed allocation priori ties were placed 
on subsidies provided by the Danish authorities. These subsidies are now 
being transfered as a lump sum, so that the Home Rule authorities can apply 
their own priorities in allocating funds to the various areas. This should 
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be viewed as a significant advance. 
Under the Home Rule administration and as a result of the political 
influence which has been exercised by the Greenlandic Hunters' and 
Fishermen's Organization <KNAPK>, the harvesting of an increasing number of 
fish and animal species has been reserved for the full - time hunters and 
fishermen whose primary source of income derives from exploitation of this 
resource <Dahl, 1988:34-5). The government has suppor1J'ed these activities 
through investment as well, mainly through the construction of small fish -
processing units and cold storage facilities. These have · served to 
facilitate the existing decentralized pattern of habitation and have 
dampened the effects of short-term fluctuations in the world market 
(op. ci t.: 29-30). 
As the Greenland economy entered the 1980s, it was no longer dominated 
by small independent hunters and fisherman, but rather, as predicted by 
G-60, was being transformed into an export-oriented fishing economy. By far 
the majority of this sector was state owned. The assumption, therefore, of 
the Royal Greenlandic Trade Department <KGH> has given the Home-Rule 
Government a decisive instrument of control <Dahl, 1986a: 317>. Greenland 
authorities see licensing to fish Greenlandic waters as a possible future 
funding source , at least until such time as t hei r own fleet i s capable of 
utilizing the entire Greenland quota. The idea of selling licenses has 
become much more realistic as a r esult of Greenland ' s 1985 decision to 
leave t he EEC <see Greenl and, 198 1; Lyc k and Taagholt , 1987 : 52> . 
6.6 Commentary 
Several factors differentiate the origin and course of Greenl andic 
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political development from that of any of other Inuit region. Most 
obvious, of course, is the nature of the resource issue. While the 
ownership of the Greenlandic sub-surface played an undeniably important 
role, it pales in comparison with that of the conflict generated by the 
Danish EEC decision. On initial inspection this may appear puzzling, as 
this issue bears little similarity to the land struggles which 
characterized political development throughout the North American Arctic, 
but the inconsistency is rather easily explained. 
Much of this difference can be attributed to effects of Greenland's 
differing system of land tenure. As .has been reported elsewhere in this 
dissertation, the Inuit did not traditionally define real property rights 
on an individual basis, controlling land instead collectively . Only in 
Greenland has this pattern remained essentially intact, with private 
proprietary rights to land nonexistent CMotzfeldt, 1987: 42). Across the 
remainder of North, the prevailing economic model heavily favoured private 
land ownership, a fact which the respective nation-state emphasized to the 
Inuit at every opportunity while simultaneously denying them title to land 
currently under their occupation . 
As a result of this pattern, it is not surprising that the Inuit 
identified the acquis_i tion of ext e r nall y legitimized land t1 tle as the 
initial prerequisite toward insuring its protection . In Greenland such an 
approach was unnecessary . It is largely as a result of this differing land 
tenure r eg i me t ha t Gr eenl andic political deve lopment has assumed its most 
distinctive characteristic, that of a downward diffusion from the regional 
level to the local, rather than the upward consolidation of local au t hority 
to the regional, which has been exemplified elsewhere <Harhoff, 1987: 132). 
There is, however, a further explanation for the Greenlandic emph asis 
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on Denmar k ' s EEC decision. The traditional Greenlandic mode of production 
revolved nearly exclusively around the exploitation of marine rather than 
terrestrial resources. It follows that a society largely based upon such 
utilization would be far more likely to identify and actively defend 
against intrusion to this area than to one threatening an area deemed to be 
of far lesser significance. The fact, therefore, that the impetus behind 
the Home Rule movement was clearly centred on the conf}ict surrounding the 
assignment of differential access to marine resources, serves to support 
this dissertation's supposition that the over-riding goal of Inuit 
political development was mode of production based. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE CENTRAL CANADIAN ARCTIC 
7.1 Inuit Tapirisat of Canada 
Founded in 1971 and claiming to represent the interests of the entire 
Inuit population of Canada, the Inuit Tapirisat <the Peoples' Team) of 
Canada <ITC) restricted its agenda fr om the beginning to issues affecting 
the rights and welfare of its people, not as political constituencies, but 
as Inuit <Vallee et al., 1984: 671). Its constituent parts reflect this 
philosophy, consisting both of Inuit regional associations as well as of 
special purpose corporations and committees devoted to Inuit concerns. Its 
six regional affiliates include the Baffin Region Inuit Association, the 
Keewatin Inuit Association, the Kitikmeot Inuit Association, and the 
Committee for the Original Peoples' Entitlement (all of the NWT), the 
Makivik Development Corporation (of Quebec) and the Labrador Inuit 
Association (of Labrador) . Although the president of each of these regional 
a f filiates does maintain a seat on the ITC ' s board of directors, fo r the 
most part these affiliates remain in control of their own day-to-day 
affairs, the ITC assisting only as required (Duffy , 1988:236). 
The I TC f irst submitted a land claims proposal to the Canadian 
government in 197 1. Beginning in 1972, additi onal research was conducted 
into bo t h his torical and curr ent I nuit l and usage , wi t h r e s ea r c h tea ms 
interviewing virtually every hunter in all thirty-three of the NWT's 
communities. This activity culminated in 1976 with the publication of the 
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Inuit Land Use and Occupancy Project <Freeman, 1976). Within the 
approximately 1.9 million square kilometres of land and 2. 1 million square 
kilometres of ocean which they considered as traditionally Inuit occupied, 
the study identified over 647,500 square kilometres viewed a~representing 
the absolute minimum necessary for the preservation of "what was left of 
their culture, identity and way of life <Duffy, 1988:238)." In addition, 
ITC funded a study team to visit Alaska, with attention f..ocused especially 
on the terms and effects of ANCSA, only then becoming fully understood. 
As an effect of this extensive and widespread involvement, ITC's 
original proposal was withdrawn in September 1976 and a new proposal 
prepared and submitted in December 1977. It was the withdrawal of this 
initial claim in the face of clearly growing intrusive pressure in the 
western Arctic which precipitated COPE' s decision to pursue its claims 
independently of those of the ITC, a decision which has resulted in severe 
and continuing intra-Inut t discord. It was ITC' s second proposal which 
first broached the subject of Nunavut. 
ITC's role was not, however, limited solely to the land claims process. 
It strongly opposed, for example, the proposal to allow exploratory 
drilling in Lancaster Sound between Baffin and Devon Islands and was 
instrumental in obtaining the moratorium responsible for its delay. The ITC 
actively supported the Inuit at Baker Lake, as well, seeking a freeze on 
both leasing .and exploration. 
wide and favourable publicity 
Eric Togoona, then ITC president, received 
with his pointed questions directed at 
Canada's Northern Affairs Minister regarding the basis for the Department's 
decision to place the profits of international mining concerns above the 
culture and livelihood of the local Inuit community <Anon., 1979: 5}. 
7.2 Nunavut Proposal 
Since 1977, the major emphasis of the ITC has been the incorporation of 
land and political claims into a comprehensive proposal for the creation of 
an Inuit controlled territory, Nunavut. Its boundaries would reflect 
historic Inuit land use patterns and would, as such, .include most of the 
east-central Northwest Territories lying north of the tree line <ITC, 
1979:7). ITC sees the political goals of Nunavut and the settlement of 
Inuit land claims as dual aspects of but a single process.. It is ITC' s 
assessment that "political change in the existing NWT is necessary for the 
successful outcome of 'land claims' negotiations Cop.cit.: 19-20)." 
Nunavut has evolved from an Inuit desire for self-determination. The 
idea, suggested Ittinuar (1978: 105), was for 
... a government which would find its place within the 
constitutional framework of Canada, and would of course be 
subject to .the ultimate sovereignty of the Parliament of 
Canada. It would be developed along the lines of Inuit 
political institutions, and it would exercise legislative 
authority in areas of jurisdiction usually associated with 
territorial and provincial governments. 
Two major reasons dictated the selection of this particular model: 
first, it was thought that as a regional government within the existing 
Northwest Territories, jurisdiction would be unacceptably circumscribed ; 
and second, it was recognized that to press for the greater authority of a 
Home Rule government akin to that of Greenland would be perceived as an 
unacceptable threat to the geo-political integrity of Canada, thereby 
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substantially limiting any chance of the mov.ement' s success (ITC, 1979: 13-
14 >. 
Despite the seeming emphasis on the political aspect of a settlement, 
the question of land remained central to the Nunavut proposal. In addition 
to the political division, the proposal called for: 
... negotiation of a settlement with the Inuit of Nunavut 
that, proceeding from recognition of historic, current and 
projected Inuit land use and occupation, will clarify existing 
Inuit property rights over land and resources and will 
compensate for rights lost through past government policies 
<op.cit.: 18). 
The design of a long-term planning regime for the region is a key 
priority. Such a regime, to be acceptable to the Inuit, must reflect: an 
awareness that the land and its resources determine the location, pace and 
quality of human activity; an awareness that resource uses may conflict or 
even be mutual exclusive; an awareness of the fragility of the Arctic 
environment; and a recognition that the primary objective of the planning 
regime of any area is the enhancement of the well-being of its people 
(op.cit.:27-8). This merely echos the Inuit's belief that the lands and 
waters are part of their environment as well as their economic base, and 
that allowance must be made for full Inuit participation both in any 
decisions affecting it as well as in the benefits accruing from 1 t CNCF, 
1983:31). 
Much of the impetus for Nunavut reflects the lack of local legitimacy 
awarded current territorial inst! tutions. Despite a clear majority of 
native people in 1 ts constituency, it was not until 1979 that the NWT first 
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elected a government within their control (a coalition of Inuit, Dene and 
M~tis). Only following the seating of this government was significant 
progress finally made on legitimizing the Nunavut proposal: a Committee was 
established to conduct regional-wide hearings and evaluate community 
response to the concept. In October 1980 the Committee submitted it s final 
report, finding no significant support in favour of retaining the current 
governmental format and calling for a referendum on the issue of dividing 
the NWT <Creery, 1983:7). 
The federal government showed far greater reluctance, consistently 
attempting to separate the proposal's compensatory and the political 
components, and making no secret of its desire to use the James Bay and 
Northern Qu~bec Agreement as a model f or all further Canadian land claims 
settlements. Unfortunately for the government of Canada, the JBNQA had 
become to be viewed with increasing disfavour by many of Canada's native 
peoples, and it is therefore unsurprisi.ng that a proposal adopting this 
model would receive little Inuit support <Brody, 1987:233-34). 
In April 1982 a plebiscite was conducted in which the residents of the 
NWT were polled regarding di vision of the territory. A strong majority 
supported the concept, with most Inuit communities endorsing it by greater 
than 80% (Creery, 1983:7). On 19 May 1982 members of the territorial 
legislature concurred, voting 19 to O in favour, an action which left the 
federal government 11 ttle option but to acquiesce, at least in principle, 
to the concept . They did, however, attach one notable condition: they 
required that before division could occur the residents of the NWT would 
have to forge a consensus on a number of crucial issues , among which was 
the question of boundaries, the future locations of any new administrative 
centres and the distribution of powers with respect to local, regional and 
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territorial level s of government <Duffy, 1988:255). 
Since 1983, a series of meetings have occurred in an attempt to come to 
terms with these questions, particularly that of the boundary issue, but 
inter-Native conflict among the Inuit, the Dene and the M~tis, and intra-
Inuit conflict between the Inuvialuit and the east-central Canadian Inuit 
has complicated this process significantly. Although negotiations have 
several times reached the brink of success, a final a.greement has not yet 
been ratified <NCF, 1987). 
7.3 Commentary 
Despite an unmistakable commonality in the source of events initiating 
the two processes, the political development of Canada's central Arctic has 
adopted a course radically separate from that chosen by the western. Two 
major factors account for this inconsistency: first, much of the difference 
reflects the degree of immediacy attached to the local resource danger; and 
second, lessons gleaned in the interim as the result of Greenland's Home 
Rule movement can be seen to have contributed to the Inuit desire for a 
solution based as much on achieving fundamental institutional changes as on 
economic goals. Al though Canadian Inuit have chosen a model considerably 
less extreme than that selected in Greenland, the ideals which drove the 
process leading to Home Rule are to a large extent reflected in those which 
have initiated the movement for Nunavut. 
( 72 ) 
I 
I I 
CONCLUSIONS 
This dissertation has focused on the relationships linking Inuit 
political development with resource conflict. Observation has shown such .. 
issues to have played a catalytic role in the process as it has occurred 
throughout the Inuit North. In each of the preceding examples, the roots of 
political development have been traced conclusively to act .i vi ties 
threatening to separate the Inuit from their resource base. On the Alaskan 
North Slope, these issues surrounded the danger represented by State land 
selections ; in both the western and central Canadian Arctic, they centred 
on the conflict generated by the intrusion of petroleum development; on the 
Ungava Peninsula, they were manifested in the threat posed by the flooding 
of traditionally utilized territory stemming from hydro-electric 
development; and, in Greenland, they resulted from the threat posed by 
Denmark's assignment of Greenlandic resources to the European Economic 
Community. 
Each can be seen to a large extent to have initiated in the conflict 
surrounding the control of resource access. The depth of the Inuit concern 
over this issue has been attributed to their recognition of the cultural 
importance retained by the indigenous mode of production, as well as by 
their perception of the potential economic benefits thought to accrue as a 
result of land ownership . The emphasis which the Inuit have placed on 
gaining recognition of their "aboriginal title" tends to add credibility to 
this argument . 
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For the most part, the pattern assumed by each thread of Inuit 
political development has 
establishment of political 
been similar, ultimately resulting in the 
structures, what Feit (1979:38) has termed 
"political articulations", linking themselves to their respective nation-
state. It is not difficult to postulate as to the motives governing the 
adoption of this approach. To adequately represent an ethnic community, it 
is insufficient to establish only distinctly ethno-politifal institutions: 
for a minority group such as the Inuit to achieve its goals, great skill 
and competence concerning the political procedures of the larger society 
are an initial and vital requirement. Such competence can be most easily 
gained in the larger arena, leading logically to the establishment of 
structures in proximity to and deemed legitimate by the nation-state. 
Although any institutions developed as a result of this process cannot be 
exclusively ethnic in nature, in each established so far, the Inuit have 
been successful at incorporating certain ethnically inspired modifications 
to better facilitate their own interests. 
If the ultimate measure of political development is assumed to entail 
an increase in the general level of self-determination, implying positive 
movement along a continuum linking total dependence to absolute 
sovereignty, there can be 11 ttle argument that over the past twenty-five 
years the Inuit have experienced a considerable degree of such development. 
The extent to which this development has successfully ameliorated early 
resource rerated concerns is, however, much more difficult to ascertain 
with any certainty. In none of the existing Inuit controlled regional 
governments is Inuit authority over the resource base yet complete . Still , 
legitimate accomplishments have been achieved , and the process continues . 
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AEC 
AFN 
ANCSA 
ANILCA 
ASNA 
ASRC 
COPE 
DNANR 
EEC 
G-60 
ICC 
IRA 
ITC 
IWC 
JBNQA 
KGH 
KNAPK 
KRG 
NANA 
NQIA 
NWT 
NSB 
NSO 
WASA 
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS 
Atomic Energy Commission 
Alaska Federation of Natives 
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971 
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980 
Arctic Slope Native Association 
Arctic Slope Regional Corporation 
"' 
Committee for the Original Peoples' Entitlement 
Department of Northern Affairs and Natural Resources 
European Economic Community 
Greenland Committee of 1960 
Inuit Circumpolar Conference 
Indian Reorganization Act of 1936 
Inuit Tapirisat of Canada 
International Whaling Commission 
James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement of 1975 
Royal Greenlandic Trade Department 
The Greenlandic Hunters' and Fishermen's Organization 
Kativik Regional Government, Quebec 
Northwest Alaska Native Association 
Northern Quebec Inuit Association 
Northwest Territories, Canada 
North Slope Borough, Alaska 
Northern Service Officer 
Western Arctic Clnuvialuit) Settlement Act of 1984 
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